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Lifestyle migration is a now-established section within the anthropology of migration, and 
interdisciplinary migration studies, usually justified by its extensive and increasing spread, 
globally.  Yet, bar a few exceptions, the political behaviour of lifestyle migrants has been 
relatively neglected. I redress this imbalance by critically comparing two overlapping 
processes where British migrants to Spain act politically: elected councillors in town-halls; 
campaigning anti-Brexit activists. This pair is as comparable as it is contrastive. In theoretical 
terms, I argue that modern versions of practice theory are a useful mode for analysing 
municipal activity by foreign agents, while the Brexit process, because novel, fast-paced, and 
open-ended, is better understood via Isin’s ‘enactment of citizenship’ approach. Both 
explanatory modes are powerful, have perspectival slants, and are best applied to different 
contexts and styles of contest: practice theorists research how people work with change; 
Isinians, how they produce it. The paper also furthers the anthropology of citizenship by 
investigating a case where the link between citizenship of a country as a prerequisite for 





Lifestyle migration is now established within interdisciplinary migration studies, usually 
justified by its extensive and increasing spread, globally, and defined as ‘relatively affluent 
individuals, moving either part-time or full-time, permanently or temporarily, to places 
which, for various reasons, signify for the migrants something loosely defined as quality of 
life’ (Benson and O’Reilly 2009a: 621; 2009b). These studies cover a range: downsizers, 
premature retirees, pensioners, labour migrants.  Their research foci usually encompass the 
decision to migrate, its practice, identity, the search for a better way of life, the process of 
settlement, and relations with locals (e.g. Benson 2011; O’Reilly 2012). Yet, bar a few 
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exceptions (e.g. Janoschka 2009; Collinson 2015; MacClancy 2015), the political behaviour 
lifestyle migrants may perform has been relatively neglected (Janoschka & Durán 2014: 61).i 
It is as though the lifestyle the migrants seek were an apolitical one which excludes the 
possibility of engaging with power, especially with institutions of the state, at a variety of 
different levels. As one overview of migration and social change states, the role of migration 
is ‘to buttress existing structures of power rather than challenge them’ (Portes 2010: 1549). 
The theoretical discussion and ethnographic material I present questions that claim.  
Here I address political dimensions of migration, assessing alternative ways of 
studying migrants’ political activities. Thus I discuss and compare two overlapping processes 
where British migrants to southeast Spain engage in political behaviour: elected councillors 
in town-halls, and campaigning anti-Brexit activists. This pair is as comparable as it is 
contrastive. In theoretical terms, I argue that while contemporary practice theory might be a 
useful mode for analysing municipal activity by foreign councillors, the Brexit process, which 
is quite different in nature, is better understood in terms of Engin Isin’s concept of the 
‘enactment of citizenship’ (Isin 2008: 15). My aim is to suggest which approach is best suited 
to which contexts, and so to both develop the political dimensions of the anthropology of 
migration, and lifestyle migration studies, and further the investigation of political 
citizenship. For if there is no single theory adequate to explain migration in general, 
different theoretical approaches being applied in different contexts (Bakewell 2010: 1692), I 
argue similar statements can be made of a particular sub-field: lifestyle migration studies.  
‘Brexit’, as used in the media and popular parlance, is a usefully vague term. It can 
refer to (1) the referendum of 23 June 2016 about departure of the UK from the EU; (2) the 
exit itself, at present (at time of writing) set for 11pm 29 March 2019; (3) the expansive 
political process caused by the result of the referendum. Since I am concerned with the 
various ways British migrants talk of Brexit, I follow their use of the term in all three senses.  
Brexit may be regarded as but another example of the restructuring of European 
politics stimulated by the 2008 debt crisis (e.g. Theodossopoulos 2013; Franquesa 2016). I 
wish to join with these authors, who broach ‘indignation’ as a comparative concept, 
highlighting the affective dimension of political activity.  Further, there is already 
commentary by anthropologists on several dimensions of Brexit itself, e.g. contributions to 
Green 2016; Edwards, Haugerud, & Parikh 2017. But much of these writings, however 
illuminating, are prompt reactions to the recent events, rather than fieldwork-based 
analyses. Also, none are concerned with the millions of British abroad, within the EU. To 
these extents, supplementary aims of this paper are to develop the study of contemporary 
political subjectivities, and to make an innovative, early ethnographic contribution to what, 
we can expect, will be a continuing topic of anthropological investigation.  
I have been conducting fieldwork in Alicante province since 2005. For the first ten 
years, I undertook ethnographic fieldwork for two months each year. In 2015 I focussed this 
research when a geographer of migration, Fiona Ferbrache, and I agreed to study 
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comparatively political activity of Briton residents: she in southwest France, me in Alicante 
province. The analysis presented in this article is based on my long-term fieldwork as well as 
interviews with over 25 people, some several times, between 2015 and 2017: practising or 
former British councillors, their Spanish opponents, their compatriot acquaintance; British 
consular officials; a Liberal Democrat MEP; British office-holders in local political and 
socially-oriented organisations. April and  June 2017 Ferbrache and I staged meetings in 
Elche, province of Alicante,  and Perigiuex respectively, on Brexit and British migrants, 
attended by campaign group representatives, consular staff, British residents, social 
scientists, local politicians, and the press. At these meetings campaign group 
representatives and British consular staff spoke to an audience of British residents, social 
scientists, local politicians, and the press. After the Elche meeting, I interviewed several 
participants and other campaign leaders.  I also traced the activity of some former British 
councillors via digital archives of the local press.ii My contact with members of the anti-
Brexit groups: I have interviewed several members of these campaign groups, some more 
than once. Though I have been invited to participate in their gatherings, and their 
demonstrations, I have declined. My relations with them may thus be classed as friendly and 
highly informative, but I do not get internally involved.     
 
In the sections which follow, I start with a comparative account and assessment of 
modern practice theory and Isin’s approach, followed by two ethnographic analyses: who, 
among British migrants to Alicante province, Spain, become town-councillors, why, and to 
what effect; the emergence of anti-Brexit campaign groups in Spain, who lead them, what 
they aim for politically, how they operate. I then compare the different discourses employed 
by participants in both arenas. The concluding section critically assesses the power of 
practice theory and Isin’s approach to these twin, but different political process. The 
broader aims of this paper are (1) to contribute to our critical understanding of the 
anthropology of political agency, with respect both to established but evolving systems, and 
to rapidly transforming, open-ended processes; (2) to further the anthropology of 
citizenship by investigating a case where the link between citizenship of a country as a 
prerequisite for legitimate political activity in it is broken. 
 
Approaches to political activity 
Some of the theoretically most sophisticated approaches to lifestyle migration have been 
inspired by Bourdieu’s theory of practice (e.g. Bourdieu 1977; Bousiou 2008; Janoschka 
2009, 2011; O’Reilly 2012; Lawson 2016). For these authors, Bourdieu’s work is valuable 
because it can integrate micro and macro levels of analysis; attempts, via his concept of 
habitus, to transcend dualisms of structure and agency, materialism and idealism; and 
deploys a fine-grained approach towards the investigation of social class and its sub-
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sections. For example, Oliver and O’Reilly show how migrants might move in order ‘to start 
a new life’ only to find that non-economic forms of capital come to loom large and divide 
the incomers according to other resources (Oliver and O’Reilly 2010). Also, the ‘clean’ break 
with their British past which many migrants claim to desire turns out in fact to be 
constrained by their habitus. It is not so much that they cannot realise their dreams rather, 
the constitution of their dreams is part of the past they wished to leave behind. ‘In other 
words, their relative symbolic capital (incorporating educational, cultural, and social capital) 
impacts on the decision to migrate and the destinations chosen, but also the life then led in 
the destination’ (Benson and O’Reilly 2009a : 618).  
 Bourdieu’s approach can be criticised for its ‘ethnocentric’ conceptions of social 
class, elitist modes of distinction, and other univerisalising notions, while his focus on 
reproduction of social forms is claimed to leave little room for change (Jenkins 1992; 
Bousiou 2008: 22; Beigel 2009: 20-21; Gemperle 2009: 14; Woodward and Emmison 2009: 
2; Daloz 2013). In response, Bourdieu claimed that he had intended habitus as a generative 
structure, albeit one whose generative capacity is limited by conditions of the time and 
place of its production (Bourdieu 1990). Thus, his later elaborated idea of habitus can be 
made to accommodate ‘invention and improvisation, such as lifestyle projects’ (Benson and 
O’Reilly 2009: 617).  
Contemporary practice theorists, building on Bourdieu’s work while fully 
acknowledging its limits, seek to overcome some of the above difficulties and broach more 
centrally the analysis of change.  Mouzelis calls for the need to recognise both intra-habitus 
tensions and interaction between actors in a field (Mouzelis 2007). Kemp argues that 
habitus needs to be integrated with reflexivity, to provide scope for individual agency (Kemp 
2010). O’Reilly, a leading exponent of modern practice theory, attempts to synthesise many 
of these corrective elements in a broad overarching approach to migration studies, which 
strives to take account of external structures, internal structures (including habitus), 
communities of practice, and outcomes. Of habitus she states that it is both ‘fairly fixed and 
transposable’, and ‘constantly changing and adapting’, though she does not detail the 
relation between fixture and change (O’Reilly 2010: 151, 160).  While her synthetic 
approach to practice theory is broadly encompassing, she recognises it ‘merely provides the 
meta-theoretical frame within which disparate studies can be brought together. It does not 
attempt to do all the work that other theories and concepts contribute’ (O’Reilly 2012: 84). 
She affirms her ‘careful and critical’ eclectic style of practice theory should ‘not be applied 
too rigorously’: it is, after all, a heuristic framework (O’Reilly 2012: 7, 160).  Postill argues in 
a parallel manner, that practice theory ‘cannot be a theoretical cure-all’; e.g. it cannot tackle 
a ‘world-historical moment’, such as the Danish Muhammed cartoons controversy, caused 
by the September 2015 publication in a Danish newspaper of cartoons depicting 
Mohammed, which he considers more a political process than a social practice (Postill 2010: 
12-13).  Comparable comments could be made about Brexit: it is above all an extended 
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process, and the anti-Brexit campaign is not a set practice, but an innovative part of that 
process.  
For Swartz, Bourdieu expected everyday disalignment between habitus and 
particular fields: mild disjuncture leads to adaptation, a gradual modification of structures; 
considerable disjuncture to transformation, producing resignation or revolt. Yet how these 
protests can lead to change is left unsaid: Bourdieu did not develop a politics of habitus 
(Swartz 2013: 236-41). Swartz’s concerns are bared in the illuminating work of modern 
practice theorist Michael Janoschka, who like me, worked in Alicante province, and on 
politically active migrants: the mid-2000s successful campaigners against mass-
expropriation programmes in the Valencian Community (which includes Alicante);  they 
were protesting against local politicians’ abuse of legislation in order to urbanise private 
land and charge the landowners for doing so.iii Janoschka recognises practice theory, 
‘developed in and exemplified by a virtually pre-modern society, . . . has certain 
shortcomings if the mobile conditions of people, capital, knowledge and practices in late 
modernity are reckoned’ (Janoschka 2011: 228; also Kemp 2010: 156). However, ‘a rapid 
and shock-like transformation’ can ‘produce a field of critical attitude that requires new 
interpretations and incorporations of the social world’ (ibid.: 228). Thus, threatened 
incomers in Valencia established ‘a temporarily radicalized habitus’, on a par with 
Bourdieu’s late invention of a ‘subversive habitus’ (ibid.: 234; Bourdieu 2005). But Janoschka 
declares he cannot tell if the consciousness of the usual habitus dispositions endures and 
‘the weight of the reified world is still felt’, or if a prolongation of the crisis turns the 
provisionally radicalized habitus into a permanently reconstituted one (ibid.: 229). I suggest 
an empirical answer to his dilemma, below.  
Janoschka’s response to the challenges of his fieldsite is imaginative but he makes 
habitus do too much work. He stretches it into a catch-all concept so malleable nothing can 
escape its reach. This version of praxis puts it on a logical par with Darwinianism:  all 
examples, no matter how seemingly aberrant, can be made to fit into its theoretical 
schema. In sum, when powerful external forces, on the very margins of the quotidian 
habitus, stimulate a diversity of creative responses in people trying to imagine, and to 
influence their place in an open-ended future, then expanded versions of the concept of 
habitus are stretched to new levels of elasticity, with all the tensions that entails. The 
relative inertia of habitus, unless defined in O’Reilly’s terms, is not easy to reconcile with the 
consideration of radical, lasting alteration. At the very least, just as a Darwinian framework 
forces one to think in terms of evolution, so deployment of habitus reminds us that 
dispositions are not wholly individual but structured; perhaps malleable but not completely 
open to fundamental change. Given this orientation of habitus towards more stable 
dispositions, it seems advisable, when studying fast-moving processes of significant change, 
such as Brexit, to look elsewhere, for instance to the work of Engin Isin on politics within 
Europe.    
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This is not to be antagonistic to contemporary practice theory. When it is pitched at 
such a high level as O’Reilly’s informative approach, it is complementary to, not conflictive 
with alternative theories, e.g. Isin’s. Here the question is, which explanatory frameworks are 
the most suitable when accounting for gradual change or for abrupt alteration. Which is the 
more telling, for each context?  
 In his evolving work on citizenship in Europe, Isin is not concerned with social 
reproduction but with social emergence (Isin 2008). For that reason, he wishes to avoid the 
downsides of conventional modes of thought in the political sciences, which otherwise 
threaten to confine new configurations of social process within traditional taxa. He wants to 
catch, and follow the provisional, fluid nature of challenging processes in a vocabulary 
unfettered by the confining connotations of established terms, developed in times of 
different circumstances, when nation states seemed sovereign and groups clearly defined.  
To free himself from those tired vocabularies, Isin devises a novel nomenclature and 
procedures for studying what he terms ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin 2013: 21-8). This is an 
activist-centred approach, which does not concentrate on rights as legal rules upheld by 
authoritative bodies integral to the nation-state or supra-national body, particularly the EU. 
Isin sees citizenship as much a bundle of legal rights as ‘a social process through which 
individuals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding or losing rights’ (Isin and Turner 
2002: 4). Thus, his emphasis tends towards the study of norms, practices, meanings, and 
identities, than on legal rights.   
Rather than researching even relatively stable social states, Isin focuses on unfolding, 
future-oriented, exploratory, contested processes, which at the same time form its activist 
protagonists into groups. For him there is no fixed EU polity, rather a complex European 
juridico-political space, composed of elements and arrangements, i.e. the legal and 
constitutional foundations of citizenship, which are sometimes contradictory, sometimes 
complementary. Citizenship here is not a stable category, but contingent, dynamic. Subjects 
make claims to rights, which invoke and challenge the arrangements within the broad 
assemblage of European institutions. Claimants traverse different sites and scale of rights 
which may cross a range of these institutions, and may do so in an unorthodox manner 
which confronts ‘dominant understandings of citizenship as membership in a contained 
polity’ (Isin and Saward 2013: 15). Coming together as common claimants, transcending 
boundaries as they go, generates new sites of belonging and identification. Sites and scales 
are not pre-fixed, but fluid, relational; they are formed through contest. Thus Isin’s 
‘enactments of citizenship’ are performative acts which produce subjects who collectively 
challenge present configurations, and which start to take what they ask for. Rights are not 
top-down exercises in abstract legalese, but here take on a social reality because they are 
claimed, usually bottom-up (MacClancy 2000: 118), by those whose performance of claim-
seeking constitutes them as political actors. This is a theoretical approach empirically 
focused on change and the conflicts which go with it, which examines topics previously 
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confined to the legal, in a variety of interconnected dimensions: political, ethical, cultural, 
sexual, and social (Isin 2013: 41). In particular, it is a shift from conventional rights-based 
studies, grounded on black-letter law, to ones more focused on processual, political 
dimensions. 
Isin is explicit about the distance of his approach from Bourdieu and his followers. 
Practice theory attends to social formation, Isin to its reformation; practice theory focuses 
on subjects who conduct themselves, Isin on subjects who act (Isin 2012: 108-9). He 
recognises practice theorists, to their credit, have demonstrated the role within citizenship 
of habitus ‘formed over a relatively long period of time’: but ‘the question of how subjects 
become claimants . . .within a relatively short period of time has remained unexplored’ (Isin 
2008: 17). For Isin, acts stand in contrast to habitus. Habitus emphasizes relatively enduring 
dispositions and accounts for ‘the persistence of an order’; acts are purposive, performative 
ruptures, which create disturbance. These ruptures enable actors (created by the acts) ‘to 
create a scene rather than follow a script’ (Isin 2009: 379). Thus for Isin, here moving 
beyond practice theory, ‘to be a citizen is to make claims to justice, to break habitus’ (ibid.: 
384).  
A further contrast between these two approaches is scale. Practice theory is all-
encompassing in scope, seeking to knit meso- and micro-level events with macro-level social 
structures (e.g. globalisation), which individuals have relatively little ability to control or 
manipulate. We might call Isin’s aims more demographically modest. He is not trying to 
explain whole societies. While including macro-level dimensions within the complex 
contexts of his localised case-studies, he concentrates on activist attacks to structure rather 
than the structures themselves, however enduring or adaptable they might be, i.e. if he 
pushes structure out of the foreground, he replaces it with actors who enact.  
 
 
Brits abroad, in town-halls 
In this, and the following section, I provide concentrated ethnographic accounts of (1) the 
lived experience of British residents who became town-councillors, and (2) the emergence 
and organisation of anti-Brexit groups by Britons resident on the Continent, above all in 
Levantine Spain. These two sections enable the subsequent ones: a comparison of the 
discourses of the British town-councillors and of anti-Brexit campaigners; and a critical 
assessment of the two theoretical approaches, contemporary practice theory and Isin’s.   
           Mass tourism in the early 1950s brought rapidly increasing numbers of Britons to 
holiday in Alicante. Some bought summer homes; some of them went on to live there full-
time. Benidorm, a fishing village, turned into the greatest conglomeration of high-rise 
buildings per capita in the world. Construction became the largest Alicantine industry, with 
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large housing estates created for the migrant market. Indigenous society experienced 
profound transformations, deeper and more broadly than in most other parts of Spain. New 
sources of wealth generated widespread affluence alongside new forms of social division.  
  In 1999, for the first time, residents from other EU countries were for allowed to 
vote and stand for office in Spanish municipal elections. By 2007 in Alicante three dozen, the 
majority of them British, had seats on town councils. These British councillors are strikingly 
diverse: in background, political trajectory, and degree of success. All but one had at least a 
full secondary education, a few were graduates. In the UK they had held various positions: 
company secretary, accountant, restaurant owner, etc., with a disproportionate 
representation of ex-policemen. Most councillors were at least late middle-aged. None had 
participated in party-based political activity in Britain, though close kin of two had been 
councillors or mayor back home. All already had some public presence, sometimes in the 
UK, more often since migration. In Spain, several had won local reputations as energetic 
activists who boosted charitable organisations, or organised campaigns, for migrant or 
environmentalist interests; one had set up Citizens Advice Services, weekly in a bar, where 
he was also approached for personal advice on a range of issues. 
 Their experience of office is very mixed.  Several felt marginalised, by fellow 
members of the local party and within the council, both in municipal matters and 
linguistically. One felt her successful efforts to raise party affiliation among migrants was 
then undermined: other councillors for her party feared she’d use the boost in numbers to 
form a migrant faction bent on unseating them. One, interviewed by a resident British 
journalist in 2003, stated she faced open xenophobia from another councillor, who thought 
‘the result of letting such people into the town hall is the destruction of local culture’. The 
latter councillor added, ‘It means changing the way we lived. People call me racist but I ask 
the foreigners whether they would like it if a Turk was running the town-hall where they 
come from, and most agree with me’ (in Tremlett 2003).iv  Local journalists may portray 
British residents in distanced, amused terms (e.g. Valdés 2015), but this councillor’s 
comments were a rare public display of unapologetic xenophobia.  
If within the governing group, the incomers were usually given the brief of 
representing European migrants within the area, but felt excluded from other business. 
They considered they were left with specific council business they had expertise in and 
which did not interest fellow councillors. Anything else on the municipal agenda was usually 
kept from them by non-migrant members of the governing group: ‘Things always happened 
without my knowledge or consultation. “Oh sorry! An oversight”, they would say. But it 
happened too often to be only an oversight.’ One councillor, who had got his initiatives 
implemented, said, ‘They were initiatives I was allowed to do to keep me from asking too 
many questions.’ Other initiatives of his had been rejected as they ‘would have been good 
for my reputation’; he felt the governing party did not want him too popular. He thought 
they regarded him as ‘a nuisance, and often a thorn in their sides, because I wanted to 
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change things.’ According to another British councillor, ‘I do not think any of the Spanish 
councillors were 100% happy that they had foreign councillors, there are three of us (one 
British, one German, one Belgian), but realised it was necessary.’  In general, these Britons 
felt they were being exploited for their electoral support from, plus access to and 
knowledge of a particular municipal population. They were not invited to ponder other 
matters. From their point of view, they were being used, and contained.  
 In contrast several considered they had managed to work well with fellow 
councillors, whether native or migrant, and had achieved much while in office. They were no 
longer merely a bridge between the town-hall and the people they assisted; now in the 
town-hall they could strive to secure reform. Some listed initiatives they had fomented and 
seen implemented, successfully: researching and putting into action a municipal version of 
the UN Agenda 21 for self-government; applying for multi-million euro EU grants; revamping 
their town’s tourist strategy; running a range of health campaigns; setting up a charitable 
network to assist the needy; developing town-hall/migrant relations; integrating the socially 
isolated; winning national awards for mobility strategies; and so on.  
At the time of standing, all of the British councillors spoke Spanish at least 
moderately well; in contrast, some other non-Spanish councillors in Alicante do not gain a 
command of the language, even while in office. Two British councillors stated native 
councillors excluded them in meetings by speaking Valencian. Both learnt to understand 
Valencian. The councillor who works with German and Belgian counterparts said they spoke 
English to one another, i.e., in some municipalities, council business is now being pushed 
towards the polyglot (English, Spanish, Spanglish, Valencian, Vanish [Valencian-and-
Spanish]), with basic Spanish as lingua franca.  
British candidates stood for a range of parties, with a slight majority on the centre-
right. In one municipality, a British woman had stood for the centre-right: in reaction her 
brother formed his own party, to oppose her: both were elected (Tremlett 2003). Whatever 
their allegiance, these councillors talked of national parties in strongly local terms. The 
municipal chapter was their primary loyalty, its regional branch viewed as occasionally 
overbearing and self-interested. They seemed more interested in municipal personalities 
than to party stances or national policies. Thus several had changed parties, more than 
once, justifying their switches by moral assessment of the representatives involved at that 
time, e.g., one environmental activist started in the Greens, which amalgamated with a left-
wing party; they conjointly entered into a coalition with the centre-left. Later they left the 
coalition and joined a successful motion of no confidence. They then entered a coalition 
with the centre-right, so winning control of the town-hall. At the following elections the 
activist was elected for the centre-right. Her actions are not particularly unusual, whether 
among foreign resident or local representatives. For each transition, she explained her 
actions in local, not national terms: some were corrupt, she claimed; councillors affiliated to 
one party, now with charges brought against them, had been replaced by a ‘new team, 
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people I could trust’. Generally in Alicantine politics, indigenous membership of parties can 
be very unstable. Transfugas (‘defectors, turncoats’) switching party is a much-denigrated, 
much-practised strategy.v 
Migrants also stand as independents or form their own parties (Simó-Noguera et al. 
2005: 20-21).  One said he had approached local branches of national parties, only to be 
rejected: from his point of view, they did not want those they regarded as outsiders. He and 
fellow migrants formed their own political party, though administrators made their official 
recognition very difficult throughout this bureaucratic process. In 2010 they finally 
established Partido Independiente por las Nacionalidades (PIPN). At its height, its 
representatives were elected to two of the thirteen councillorships in its local town-hall, 
while its busy Facebook page demonstrates its sustained raft of activities and campaigning, 
as well as the space given in the regional press to its campaigns.  Some party members 
called for secession of the large, migrant-dominated estate: electorally, it dwarves the 
original village yet receives a disproportionally low fraction of the municipal budget to fund 
services. They wish the estate to constitute its own municipality, receiving its resident’s 
taxed income rather than losing it to the village town-hall. This municipal rebordering, 
primarily for fiscal purposes, is a long-established practice in Spain.  Migrants’ deployment 
of this strategy is a further example of their adaption to their new place of residence.  
 Most foreign councillors were surprised by the deeply politicized conduct of 
municipal business, with accusations of corruption or favouritism embittering town-hall 
debates.  Some were taken aback how easily partisan interests smothered communal 
concerns. But since none had direct party-political experience in the UK, their surprise 
lacked comparative base. Some complained of vote-rigging: they claimed the registration of 
some migrant residents ‘dropped off the register’, and supporters of the mayor’s party were 
allowed to vote though unregistered. Some described the style of some mayors as 
ademocratic, even edging towards the dictatorial. One said the mayor came to his house, 
and banged the table: ‘This is how things are! This is how things will be!’ November 2017 
the mayor was found guilty of prevarication and banned from holding public office for 8 and 
a half years.  
 ‘Corruption’ was a much-repeated concern of British councillors. Since its perceived 
scale is an evolving composite of political, judicial, economic, and media factors, I cannot 
here report on its incidence, only report its perceived prevalence. Alicantine sociologists 
argue that over the last thirty years the devolution of powers from higher to municipal 
levels of government has enabled corruption to spread (Huete and Mantecón 2012: 91). 
One British councillor stated that in the 2011 elections, the till-then governing party and the 
opposition forces won four seats apiece, making him ‘the key’, i.e. that his support would 
open the door to the town-hall for either faction. Shortly after, he said one telephone-caller 
offered him a car, and another suggested, ‘Go with us, and by the end of your term, you’ll 
be a millionaire.’  Or, as the (Spanish) President of his Residents’ Association put it to me, 
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‘There is no honest political class in Spain. People get elected to make money.’ Further, in 
October 2008 in San Fulgencio municipality, the sole British councillor became the default 
leader of the town-hall after the mayor, deputy mayor and four other councillors were 
‘taken into police custody following allegations of real estate corruption’; he spoke a 
‘smattering’ of Spanish (Govan 2008). In turn, some British councillors have been formally 
accused of corruption by the appropriate legal bodies. One ex-councillor accused of this 
explained that he had resigned so that any of his planned, further municipal actions could 
not be questioned, and to reinforce his point that the mayor, already facing multiple 
charges, should himself have stepped down long before. 
Nepotism was a further concern expressed by British councillors. Two councillors 
from one municipality said all eight members of the governing body in their town-hall are 
close kin or affines, with municipal contracts going to their relations, in-laws, and friends, in 
a stereotypical clientelist manner: in their view, large contracts are rapidly waved through 
meetings, and smaller contracts can lead to surprisingly large bills. Throughout Alicante 
province, the continuing succession of court cases against municipal corruption, widely 
reported in the local press, suggest why these practices are perceived as widespread.vi 
According to one British ex-councillor,  
I have witnessed so much corruption here that some politicians treat it as a hobby. 
Some councillors treat the Council workforce as their own and get them to do their 
gardens, paint their houses, etc. The workers say nothing for fear of losing their jobs. 
Politics in Spain is dirty. It needs to be cleaned out.  
The Alicantine sociologists refer to a ‘deficit in the quality of local democracy’ (Huete and 
Mantecón 2012: 89). 
 Anthropologists of Europe speak of small-town inhabitants forming ‘moral 
communities’ (e.g. Heiberg 1989; Sorge 2009). We may be observing much the same in the 
context of Spain. As British consular staff underlined, ‘There is a large “grey area” between 
what is illegal and what enchufismo (“plugging-in”), i.e. helping your family and friends get 
jobs and make money’. What is regarded as corruption appears accepted, so long as it is 
kept within bounds. British migrants repeatedly told me most locals, though friendly, still 
regard them as ‘fair game’. Data from my own fieldwork suggest migrants are not singled 
out: several resident British migrants said to me that any outsider from beyond the locale 
may be taken advantage of. Spanish (social scientist) colleagues of mine based in the 
general area did not deny it, just downplayed its incidence, i.e., these moral communities 
usually exclude others, whether from other lands or provinces; and when assessing 
municipal actions, locals live in a constant tension between state-defined legal codes and 
what they will accept as tolerable practice.  
  In my discussions with British councillors and municipal activists, complaints about 
corruption, nepotism, and local forms of democracy segued with moral assessments 
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grounded on ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’.  The secretary of one residents association said, ‘I’m not 
going to stand for office. I just want things for the people here.’  The councillor who set up 
Citizens Advice Services said he had done so, ‘Because I’m a mean Scotsman’, who thought 
local service providers overly greedy, ‘just taking money from the expats. This is unfair. Lots 
of things are unfair in this world, and I’d like to rebalance it.’ The PIPN Facebook page 
speaks of making ‘creative and meaningful steps towards political empowerment of the 
expat community.’ Guided by their ‘moral and ethical concerns, our intellectual 
contributions and our strength of numbers’, they ‘want to help to give our community the 
voice it needs and deserves.’vii Its founding President told me its ethos was ‘fairness, 
equality, openness for all the residents of the municipality’ (original emphasis).  
 The practice of British migrant councillors need not develop in this way, as the little 
comparative material available suggests. Studies of British councillors in France show they 
stood for election primarily for social reasons: to expand their acquaintance and get 
involved in local projects (Ferbrache and Yarwood 2015). Indeed several councillors were so 
disinterested in political process that, when interviewed in 2007, it became clear how poorly 
they understood the French political system. One could not even name the current prime 
minister (Drake and Collard 2008: 227). In sum, the diverse, energetic Britons elected into 
town-halls had mixed experience of office: of achievements and frustrations. Their actions 
were limited to the municipal, and their evaluatory discourse grounded on general notions 
of ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’.  
 
 
Brits abroad and Brexit 
In this section, I summarise the rise, composition, organisation, aims, and apparent 
effectiveness of the anti-Brexit groups in Alicante province. This, together with the 
preceding section, allow us to compare, in later sections, differing modes of political 
behaviour among British residents in Spain, and how most tellingly to analyse these differing 
but related modes.  
According to my interlocutors, the first reaction to the referendum result by many 
British residents who voted ‘Remain’ was numbness. They explained that soon morphed 
into an extended, emotional process they explicitly compare to grieving. Their 
‘bereavement’, which could last three weeks, was one mixed with worry, fear for the future, 
and ‘severe depression’. In some places, these sentiments were heightened by the sardonic 
reaction of their Spanish friends. One said the day after the result village acquaintance 
would approach him in the street with a condescending smile, ‘But Peter, you are still here! 
When are you going home?’ Another said that on the same day the local mayor, a friend, 
knocked on his door to say, with a smirk, and in English, ‘Bye, bye, Jim. Bye, bye.’ Though 
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sardonicism was not universal, no one I spoke with or knew reported sympathetic interest 
from their Spanish neighbours. These deeply upset residents shared their grave concerns 
and anger with similarly afflicted friends and acquaintance, both face-to-face and digitally. 
Some of the more energetic agreed to organise, but exactly into what they were not 
immediately sure.   
The campaigning groups began to emerge, first between friends, next by word-of-
mouth, then by email and the creation of online-mediated groups. It is important to 
emphasize from the beginning how much campaigners’ activities are enabled, indeed 
boosted by social media, especially Facebook and Twitter. For this struggle is the first UK-
centred, transnational popular political protest against the actions of the governing party in 
Britain, and it is so effective and well-organised because, partially but crucially, much of its 
activity takes place online. Most of these groups have at least one, if not several IT-savvy 
members within their inner circle; the websites of many are sophisticated and kept 
rigorously up-to-date; their Facebook pages are equally active fora for disseminating 
information and exchanging opinions. Given the feelings generated by the referendum, 
these fora may fulfil further functions. The press has widely reported that Brexit has divided 
families and endangered friendships (e.g. Frostrup 2016; Lindsey 2016; Pearson 2016; Harris 
2017; Lyons 2017; Marsh 2017; Delingpole 2018). A Remain in France Together (RIFT) 
spokesperson stated, at the meeting in June 2017 in Perigueux my co-worker and I 
organised for the campaign groups, that some members were spending several hours a day 
on their Facebook page: he explained that it provides ‘a safe place for them to let off steam 
about Brexit’, as well as offering them ‘a lifeline and measure of understanding they don’t 
get with their families’.   
Many groups grew remarkably quickly, primarily thanks to the Internet. For example, 
the week after the 2016 referendum some like-minded British migrants in AlmerÍa, 
southeast Spain, met and agreed to canvas support for an organised group, which they 
dubbed Europats. Within six weeks, its organisers had developed a database of about a 
thousand email addresses; by June 2017, 6,000. Here, IT is making the velocity of interaction 
a social factor of its own, its temporal affordances enabling choice of political trajectory 
(MacClancy n.d.) 
Some groups are nationally framed, e.g. Bremain in Spain, RIFT. As online-oriented 
communities, however, campaign groups are not necessarily confined to national 
boundaries. The constitution of some is explicitly transnational, aiming to represent British 
migrants in more than one country or throughout the EU, e.g. Brexpats-Hear Our Voice. 
Some, mindful that the EU wishes to negotiate the position of EU residents in the UK, seek 
to act for both Britons abroad and EU migrants in Britain, e.g. Expat Citizen Rights in Europe 
(ECREU), Eurocitizens. In early 2017 eleven groups formed a broad EU-wide coalition: British 
In Europe, with c.30,000 members, by June 2017. Most put the particular priorities of their 
individual groups temporarily aside for the sake of exploiting the power of agglomeration.  
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Representatives, one from each group, teleconference fortnightly to share news and 
information, debate present issues, finesse priorities, promote events and campaigns, and 
agree on pressing actions; sub-groups, working on specific tasks, meet online more often, 
then disseminate information to the membership. The coalition is so successful that some 
groups now question their independent existence.  
Leaders of some of the Spanish-based groups accept the majority of their 
membership is regionally confined; this can lead to recruitment flatlining. Leaders of 
geographically wider groups see the resulting organisational diversity as a richness, not a 
weakness: the more regionally-oriented groups can maintain activity at the local level; the 
wider groups can invest more energy in broader initiatives. A more local, Hispanocentric 
group, such as Europats, tends to focus on working with their local town-halls, municipal 
commonwealths (mancomunidades), and deputies to the national Cortes, seeking and often 
receiving support from these different levels for their claims, as well as contacting British 
MPs.  
The pre-Brexit political experience of the activists resident in Spain is mixed. Some 
had none previously; one leader of a major group stated that current affairs had not 
interested her at all until the referendum. However, unlike the councillors, several leading 
anti-Brexiters do have British-based experience of activist campaigning. Many of them had 
careers in public service: the NHS, the police, municipal administration; some have received 
honours for their distinguished public service. But remarkably few of them had participated 
beforehand in campaigns in Spain. Thus for British residents, standing for the town-council 
and setting up at least major Brexit campaign groups appear to be relatively separate 
trajectories, so far.  This difference is not absolute: a sole British town-councillor did attend 
the Elche meeting my co-worker and I organised in April 2017: she had recently got her 
town-hall to declare concern for its British residents, and had then personally handed the 
declaration to the Prime Minister of Spain.  
Whatever their organisers’ level of experience, their concerted actions appear to 
achieve results, keeping their concerns high up on the Brexit agenda of HMG. Their actions, 
to date, include: block-emailing the Department for Exiting the European Union (DexEU); 
issuing an Alternative White Paper on the EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill; lobbying MPs, 
Lords, and MEPs; maintaining contacts with embassies, consulates, and academics (such as 
myself); co-launching a European Citizens’ Initiative to guarantee EU passports for post-
Brexit Brits; co-organising, participating in, and speaking at anti-Brexit demonstrations in 
London, Madrid, and other cities; January 2017, being accepted as representatives of British 
migrants and transmitting their concerns to the House of Commons Select Committee for 
Exiting the EU. In the world of politics, where statements can be made for a plethora of 
reasons, and interpreted in an equally diverse manner, it can be difficult to provide 
definitive proof, if that is so desired, that the groups have produced change. Also, a certain 
scepticism is necessary when assessing the self-made claims of groups about their 
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effectiveness. However, the groups  can adduce evidence which indicates strongly that their 
words do have weight: for instance, information supplied by Bremain in Spain was re-stated 
in the House of Commons, and one of their lobbyists was quoted in debate in the chamber. 
In March 2017 the coalition was pleased the report for the Committee on Exiting the EU 
accepted several of the migrants’ concerns.  Further, as one Bremain in Spain representative 
claimed, ‘We have considerably influenced the content of the EU proposals on citizens’ 
rights—it is evident every time we submit new information, as the proposals have changed 
before our eyes, sometimes even using the exact same language’ (Bremain representative, 
email, 20 iii 2018).viii  
Though many group representatives have previous campaigning experience, they 
were surprised at what they see as the cynicism, duplicity, and exploitation they are 
experiencing from governing politicians. In early 2017 David Jones, Minister of State at 
DeExEU, told the House of Commons, ‘We have engaged a range of stakeholders, including 
migrant groups, to ensure we understand the priorities of UK nationals living in EU 
countries’. Since none recalled speaking to Jones, campaigners responded by block-emailing 
DeExEU with their concerns. One activist said MPs had told representatives of her group, to 
their surprise, ‘You’ve moved away. Why should we bother?’ Also, the governing 
Conservative party had told them that a ‘Votes-for-life’ Bill, guaranteeing the electoral rights 
of British migrants, would go through, but then failed to ensure that it did. In April 2017, in 
conference-call meetings with British residents in Spain, held in the British Embassy, Madrid, 
and the British Consulate, Alicante, Jones and other HMG spokespersons emphasized they 
wished the campaign groups to make repeated representations to the Spanish Government 
to support their demands. At meeting’s end, the spokespersons thanked group 
representatives ‘for telling us things and ideas we’d not have thought of’ (Interview with 
Bremain representative, April 2017). One campaign leader saw this as DexEU relying on the 
groups for information, and wanting them to do its work for Ministry ends: to prepare the 
Spanish Government before HMG began negotiating seriously on the issues. On this 
interpretation, HMG assisted in empowering activists: recognising the worth of their 
interstitial position and asking them to intercede on their behalf. According to this logic, 
HMG acknowledged its own relative weakness and created a further space in this open-
ended process, another one within which the activists could play a political role. The British 
Consul, Alicante, is keen I emphasize this is a campaigner’s interpretation, not that of the 
Consulate.  
These groups direct their efforts at politicians, but also run press offices, to correct 
misrepresentation of the migrant populations: most English media tend to stereotype 
residents in Spain as jingoistic retirees, though only c.35% of British residents there are 
pensioners; the great majority of the rest hold down some work.ix Similarly, the campaign 
group Britain in Europe works to counter continental simplifications with a website photo 
gallery underlining the diversity of British migrants: workers from diverse sectors, 
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schoolchildren, single parents, entrepreneurs, pensioners, early retirees, families, students. 
Though most are lifestyle migrants, no one sub-group dominates.x 
In sum, the anti-Brexit groups formed and grew very fast, by activists who had little 
experience of campaigning in Spain. The Internet enabled the level of organisation and 
speed of political response of the groups, and they appear to having an effect, and regard 
themselves as having effects, in their dealings with EU bodies.  In the following two sections, 
I compare the discourse of the town-councillors and the campaigners, and then investigate 
how well application of contemporary practice theory and Isin’s approach can enlighten our 
understanding of the activities of both groups.  
 
A language and practice of morality, or of rights?  
The town-councillors attempt to justify their actions and aims in terms of what they might 
class an everyday ethics. They propound a morality whose appeal and persuasive power is 
based on an implicit claim: their ethics is so commonsensical, so universally acceptable that 
no further grounds of justification are necessary; hence their unquestioned concern to 
denounce corruption, nepotism, and other municipal abuse. They utilise an ‘unofficial’ 
ideology, one not subject to the same stringent criteria of internal coherence as the 
carefully thought-through social theory of professional party politicians.  For councillors, 
unexamined notions of fairness and justice are good-enough yardsticks; popularly accepted 
modes of evaluating ideas and behaviours whose deployment should prove relatively 
uncontroversial. In effect, they argue what kind of municipal candidate could have any 
chance of electoral success if they dared to openly oppose the upholding of fairness and 
justice? 
In contrast the activists, though also migrant politicos, operate in a very different 
terrain. Like the town-councillors, they have to bend to administrative procedure. Unlike 
them, they are entering much more extensive, amorphous, complex, multicultural spaces 
where appeals to a quotidian, vernacular morality, perhaps one more posited than tightly 
integrated or logically structured, hold little chance of sway. Instead, in the hope of 
achieving their aims, the contexts they are entering, and helping to re-fashion, force them 
to adopt a rights-based discourse.  
A further contrast is their attitude to ‘Europe’. Very few councillors referred to it as a 
relevant category. The topic was not even raised in my 2015 interviews: councillors’ 
horizons were mainly limited to the local, a bit to the regional, and rarely to the national; 
anything beyond seemed below their skyline. Studies of British councillors in southwest 
France in the mid-2000s and the early 2010s report the same (Drake and Collard 2008: 227, 
Ferbrache and Yarwood 2015: 79).  In contrast, Janoschka, who fieldworked in the 2000s, 
found ‘a strategic use’ of European identity by foreign councillors as a foil to comment on 
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local politics (Janoschka 2010: 710). But this was most likely a consequence of the 
contemporary anti-expropriation campaign in his fieldsite, where protestors’ concerted, 
repeated appeals to the EU were central to achieving their aims. Unlike the ‘Euro-shy’ 
councillors Collard, Ferbrache and I interviewed, anti-Brexit campaigners, by definition, 
make the EU and ‘Europe’ key frames within which they act. Their discourse would be 
incoherent without them.  
The main priorities of the campaign groups are: access to healthcare services; 
securing of pensions; unfettered travel; home ownership; exchange rates; votes for life; 
inheritance rules;  choice of country of retirement. They couch their claims in a language of 
rights and citizenship. For instance, ECREU calls itself ‘a lobby and self-help group set up to 
ensure that the issue of individual rights are foremost in the minds of those negotiating our 
future within the EU’; one of its two key aims is ‘to protect the best interests of UK citizens 
living in the EU’. Similarly, the Governing Principle of the Alternative White Paper is: ‘UK 
citizens currently resident in the EU and EU citizens currently resident in the UK should be 
expressly treated as continuing to have the same rights as they had before Brexit’ (Golding 
and Morgan 2017: 2). All the fundamental statements of the other campaign groups mirror 
ECREU’s: there is no appeal to a common morality.  Rather, as still members of the EU, they 
believe they have the right to claim and secure rights, and they argue within the terms of 
that discourse. In other words, the town-councillors wish to traverse a primarily ethical 
terrain to reach a just end, while the campaigners triangulate their course along the 
contours of rights-based discourse, i.e. along social, political and legal lines.  
 Activists couch the possession of rights within a broad concept of citizenship. One 
highly innovative dimension of their campaign is that they are attempting to help generate a 
new style of citizenship. Traditionally, citizenship was defined within the frame of the 
nation-state (Isin and Turner 2002). The citizens of a country, and there were no citizens 
without countries, were those born and brought up within the borders of that country. This 
was the general rule, though of course there were always some exceptions: e.g. those born 
abroad to nationals working on government service or for colonialist end. This general 
assumption was so well-rooted and accepted that it usually went unquestioned. Thus 
citizenship and nationality could mesh unproblematically, indeed almost invisibly. 
 The sustained development of the EU questioned that hitherto-assumed categorical 
rationality (Lister 2008). As it struggled toward the creation of a supra-national entity, the 
link between citizenship and nationality was logically disrupted, and with it the assumed 
association of rights with nationality. For instance, Britons disgruntled about an aspect of 
governance became able, as EU members, to challenge the sovereignty of their own nation-
state by appealing to a novel body: the European Court of Human Rights. Both the Court 
and the European Convention of Human Rights, which it upholds, are without precedent in 
English legal history and, as such, a particular bugbear for pro-Brexiteers. But logical 
disruption does not entail dissolution: though Eurocrats might wish to give further 
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substance to notions of European citizenship, fiscal practice and actuarial processes across 
the EU still ‘presume a more or less static and bounded populace’; the fluid lives of migrants 
are confounded by fixed laws, ones in need of change (Ackers and Dwyer 2004: 463). The 
sum result of these and related EU-phenomena is that EU citizenship remains a shifting, 
contested notion; it is that open contestation which activists exploit, to create a dynamic 
space in which to develop their case. Indeed the legal theorist Patricia Mindus argues the 
best possibility of decoupling EU citizenship from its member-state counterparts, to the 
benefit of post-Brexit Brits abroad,  is via a mass citizens’ initiative (Mindus 2017: 92-94). If 
this be right, the activists’ power to set the agenda and steer the refiguring of EU citizenship 
is potentially all the greater.  
The activists are not working towards ‘shadow-nationality’ (Ronkainen 2011), a 
‘citizenship of convenience’, where migrants ‘cherry-pick their rights and strategically evade 
certain’ territorially-defined duties’ (Ferbrache and Yarwood 2015: 82), or ‘reciprocal rights’, 
beloved of social contract theorists, which attend to both the rights of citizens and those of 
states; nor, unlike the claimants studied by Isin, are they usually claiming ‘a right. . .to a 
liveable life when no such prior authorisation exists’ (Isin 2013: 32). Instead, they are 
advancing a maximalist position, seeking to pressure EU bodies and those of relevant 
member-states to guarantee as many of the rights they at present enjoy, and to guarantee 
certain rights they do not at present enjoy, e.g. votes for life. (Britons who reside abroad for 
more than fifteen years lose their right to vote in UK national elections.) At the same time, 
some have pursued an alternative strategy: organising a petition, signed so far by over 
21,000, calling on the Spanish Government to grant dual nationality, a status which does not 
yet exist in Spain, for Britons resident in the country for over ten years.xi In sum, as occurred 
in Italy, though there because of organised protest by underprivileged migrants (Oliveri 
2012), activists can significantly contribute to open the boundaries of citizenship. 
Why did these incomers become politically active in the first place? Again, it is hard 
to generalise about the councillors. Four said local politicians had invited them to stand; 
they were seen as vote-catchers, attracting the migrant electorate to the party ticket. Two 
said acquaintances had urged them to stand. Almost all had previously worked in socially-
oriented organisations. Almost all mentioned that office-holding had integrated them better 
into native society; indeed several underlined they now had many more Spanish friends 
than English ones. Perhaps the key difference between them and the campaigners is that 
their initiatives have tended to be far more individual in style, and rarely stretched beyond 
municipal boundaries. In contrast, from their very beginning, the campaigners have been 
united in their upset and anger. They share their indignation, and turn it to productive end, 
ultimately to a continental boundary.  
Activists’ behaviour may  be regarded as a means for them to regain an integral 
sense of self. If identity is today considered socially and personally central yet dynamic and 
contested, then the June 2016 referendum is a rare instance of what some activists class the 
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‘theft’ of their identity: a label they possess and value has been ‘stolen’ from them. As a 
member of the Bremain in Spain Council stated to me, ‘I was raised in Britain, worked in 
Germany, have lived in Spain for twelve years, and am going to Italy soon to marry my 
Italian boyfriend, where we will live. I feel very, very European. How can people take that 
from me?’ Others complain they are being involuntarily re-classed from EU-residents to 
migrants, while the campaign groups reject openly their subaltern status and proclaim their 
actorhood by their much-repeated slogan, ‘We are not bargaining chips!’ Turning activist 
can be seen as a way to publicly declare opposition to this categorical dispossession, and to 
retain a sense of the snatched identity. Theodossopoulos, studying the Greek financial crisis, 
saw locals’ identification with communal indignation as an attempt to explain, and so 
subdue the crisis (Theodossopoulos 2013: 208). Something similar is occurring in Spain. For 
both Greeks hobbled by austerity measures and UK migrants fighting Brexit, their voiced 
indignation is empowering. Of course this empowerment is not exclusive to the activists: 
PIPN’s Facebook page declares its morally-grounded desire ‘to make meaningful steps 
towards political empowerment’. It is difficult to avoid adding that some might also see 
prominent activism both as self-therapy, and as a means to create a publicly virtuous 
position for oneself, though denigrated by some non-activists as  ‘keyboard warriors’ 
(activists whose activity does not venture beyond their computer)  or ‘snowflakes’ (a 
delicate item that can only endure in narrowly defined conditions).  
 
 
The habitus of town-halls, the enactment of Brexit 
Bourdieu’s approach, born out of his study of Kabyle rural society in 1950s Algeria (Bourdieu 
1977), and modern versions of practice theory fit cases where change is gradual or 
modulated. They dovetail with an analysis of maintained, but developing municipal practice, 
where foreign residents exploit their social capital to win seats, and develop their cultural 
capital by learning to understand Valencian.  
In Spanish town-halls, the routines are humdrum, though the practices may be lively. 
Their habitus has long accommodated fiery debate, petty tyrants, secession, nepotism, 
clientelism, switching parties, and other forms of ill-regarded but much-pursued municipal 
behaviour.xii The election of British residents has not altered significantly this habitus; 
indeed some have been accused of corruption themselves. British councillors may propose 
and see implemented innovative initiatives, but this is a long-established part of municipal 
government. Native councillors may work to restrict their effectiveness, to limit their 
activities, and to fragment their power blocs but, again, this is in the nature of time-
honoured interfactional competition: i.e., the elected foreigners have both learnt to adapt, 
and to adapt to, municipal ways. The habitus evolves; it is not questioned fundamentally.  
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Janoschka, who fieldworked during the mid-2000s expropriation campaign, asked 
whether the ‘temporarily radicalized habitus’ would turn into a permanently reconstituted 
one (Janoschka 2011: 229). None of the British I spent time with mentioned this campaign; 
when asked, most confessed ignorance or very mild, distanced knowledge of it. This 
suggests foreign residents’ sense of activist history is shallow: no incomer councillors have 
yet retained their posts for a third term, while many migrants return home on widowhood 
or impending infirmity. My field data also suggest the mid-2000s radicalisation of habitus 
was indeed temporary; it did not extend beyond the successful achievement of the 
campaign’s aims. The organisation formed by the protestors achieved its aims and ended. 
Its lessons have seemingly been forgotten.  
Until 1999 it was commonly accepted non-national residents were not to criticize 
Spanish politics publicly. What the arrival of the British migrants to office and their 
performance once there has changed is participants’ notions of electoral and political rights, 
and the link of those with ideas of nationality. None of the councillors I interviewed raised 
these points; it was not part of their vocabulary. But once the Spanish Government had 
accepted that non-Spanish EU-member state residents could vote and stand in municipal 
elections, Britons and other migrants became able to exercise hitherto-unknown rights: to 
become political participants in a European country in which they had not been born or 
raised, but in which they resided. The bond between nationality and the ability to voice local 
political opinion had been broken. For the first time, non-Spanish residents could stand on 
soap-boxes or rise in town-hall meetings, and publicly damn the conduct of local Spanish 
representatives without being accused of meddling in other people’s business: from 1999, it 
was their business. This was the key, perhaps revolutionary change: in terms of practice 
theory, it was more a change of field than a radicalisation of habitus. In other words, the 
verbal strategy or disposition was not new; habitus did not change, but those who could 
practise it had altered: the field had been expanded to include migrant residents. Legitimate 
political activity within an EU country was no longer dependent on the actor being a citizen 
of that country.  
In contrast Isin’s approach is specifically targeted at cases where alteration is central. 
It focuses on examples where radical challenge to the status quo and an open-ended 
process are at the core of relevant activities. It fits with an analysis of an innovative, ever-
developing campaign in a novel situation. To use Isin’s vocabulary, the 1999 change enabled 
foreign residents to enact EU citizenship in a novel manner, but within a stable context. The 
Brexit process is different. Even if the notion of habitus could be stretched productively to 
incorporate its multiplex dimensions, which I doubt, it would still fail to grasp in an 
adequate manner what makes Brexit unusual. For this is a future-oriented, geographically 
diverse process where only the general end is clear:  British departure from the EU. Exactly 
how, on what grounds, in what terms withdrawal occurs is being decided now in a much 
contested negotiation, where even the nature of the participants, what they can perform, 
and what they can achieve is being progressively defined.  
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The sustained actions of the activists, via social media, in face-to-face meetings, in 
the streets, appears to be having a noticeable steer on the course of these debates and 
negotiations. Bottom-up agitators, they are challenging top-down arrangements, exposing 
the otherwise seemingly monolithic EU polity as in reality a complex European institutional 
assemblage, a variety of different stages where they can stake their claims and make their 
voices heard, as both securers and claimants of rights, who are operating provincially, 
nationally, internationally. They are imaginatively navigating a range of different sites and 
scales in what for many politicians were unexpected, unauthorised, and somewhat 
unconventional ways. They confront ‘dominant understandings of citizenship as 
membership in a contained polity’ and in so doing demonstrate its dynamic and fluid nature, 
its ongoing process of construction (Isin and Saward 2013: 15). At the same time, to deploy 
Isin’s taxa, the activists’ acts turn themselves from residents into performative actors, 
whose events, e.g. demonstrations, appeals, and claims, ‘create possibilities of acting in 
certain ways not previously possible’ (Isin 2013: 23).  
Isin’s approach can be re-assessed, however, in at least two aspects. First, Isin wants 
to emphasize the fluid nature of the dynamic processes he wishes to see studied. He also 
desires to escape the disabling dimensions of former theories by creating a novel analytical 
vocabulary.  Yet his choice of terms is too static, emphasizing ‘acts’ rather  than process, so 
threatening to unravel a central thread of his approach. One could counterargue this is a 
necessary consequence of linguistic structure: every sentence has to have a noun. But 
isolating concentrated though brief stretches of processes as ‘acts’ is always open to 
charges of arbitrary delimitation and threatens to cramp the processual dimensions Isin is so 
keen to develop. Perhaps we should concentrate on processes of enacting rather than 
moments of ‘acts’.  
Second, Isin’s approach is insufficiently self-reflexive. The activists he studies 
participate in a rolling context, of which they and we their scholars are a part. Yet the 
present style of Isin’s theory ignores the integral role of a researcher as a participant in the 
process he/she is studying: in the context of Brexit, that role may be central both because of 
the creative, open-ended nature of activism here, and because of internet activity. Two 
examples: first, at a Brexit seminar held at Southampton University in March 2017, a 
doctoral student studying one activist campaign group discussed his rapid incorporation into 
its inner circle.xiii When asked if he was now more an activist than an analyst, he replied, ‘I 
analyse data, I make comments on positions taken, I do not suggest strategy.’ Whether he 
can retain that distinction as the process develops remains open. Second, after I gave lunch 
at an Oxford college to a leader of another group, and invited other representatives to our 
Elche gathering in April 2017, accounts of both meetings soon went up on their websites, as 
they did on our project webpages. Ferbrache and I had hoped our webpages would become 
an integratory site of their own, bringing together otherwise disparate groups. In fact the 
meeting itself, more than the website, fulfilled that role. In this sense, activist and analyst 
both play parallel but interactive games for similar justificatory ends, though of course the 
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effect of each is wildly different. Either way, the point remains: we should not prematurely 
exclude ourselves from the exploratory, unfolding processes we study, even if our own role 
may be minor.  
 
+ 
The theories anthropologists choose steer the ways we analyse our data, and vice versa. 
Contemporary practice theory accommodates to dimensions of change, but still amidst a 
relatively enduring habitus. The work of most practitioners thus leans towards closure: the 
establishment of new habits. Isinians take an opposing tack, deliberately, chasing change 
and its kaleidoscopic variations, patterns developing with each turn. They select the open-
ended and exploratory, tracking process over structure, the contested and the provisional 
over the lasting. Though they might work at different scales and have different limitations, 
practice theorists research how people cope with change; Isinians, how they produce it.  
Anthropologists of lifestyle migration have tended to neglect its potential political 
dimensions. I have tried to redress that imbalance, analysing two overlapping examples 
where lifestyle migrants behave politically. British councillors in Spain have struggled, 
sometimes successfully, to alter the course of municipal policy and style while 
simultaneously adapting to many of its regulations. But their domination by native 
councillors restricts their innovatory range. There are few such constraints in Brexit. 
Campaigners are as creative as they can, and can see themselves as empowered by HMG. 
They are protagonists, not bit-part actors, fighting to mould the continuing process of which 
they are a part. 
The activity of both the councillors and the anti-Brexit campaigners demonstrate the 
dynamic nature of citizenship, broadly conceived, today. Study of their behaviour furthers 
the anthropology of modern citizenship. The migrant councillors have exploited the EU-
decoupling of political activity and a nationally grounded citizenship, in the process fleshing 
out what constitutes an emerging, novel form of municipal citizenship. More recently, 
campaigners are fighting to secure novel arrangements of EU-citizenship, pressuring 
governments to adjust. These protestors create an affective political economy, bound 
together in an empowering state of righteous indignation. In the above, I have analysed to 
date the unfolding of these twin processes. What forms of citizenship are finally accorded, 
how effective or enduring a motor indignation will be are two concerns campaigners 
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